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Abstract:  
 
This paper examines the stability of Islamic banks and conventional banks during and after the 
recent global crisis by determining the impact of the crisis on the banks’ stability. This was 
accomplished by measuring the z-score (the stability measure) for both types, with 96 
observations of 12 banks in 4 countries where both types of banks have significant market share. 
This analysis suggests that Islamic banks performed differently during the last financial crisis, 
but that conventional banks are more stable overall. Islamic laws prevent Islamic banks to get 
affected in the first stages of the crisis because those laws encourage banks to invest in real 
assets, but the banks were affected by the subsequent stages, which indicates the relationship 
between Islamic banks and the real economy. Panel data was used as an econometrics technique 
and determined a negative relationship between stability and the leverage.    
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  Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Islamic finance has become an important sector in particular after the financial crisis of 2008-09. 
Investors started to care about stability, performance of banks, therefore, there was more interest 
in understanding the stability and performance in Islamic banks and conventional banks.  
 
1.1: Background 
 
Islamic banking is growing at a remarkable pace.  Since its inception four decades ago, the 
number of Islamic financial institutions has risen worldwide from one bank, the Dubai Islamic 
bank, in 1975, to over 375 banks today (El Qorachi, 2005; Abdul Rehman, 2016). In 2015, the 
Islamic finance industry reached a gross value of USD 1.88 trillion, growing at a rate of 17.6% 
over the years between 2009 and 2013, in spite of the economic challenges such as low energy 
prices, the decrease in the economic growth and geopolitical conflicts (Islamic financial services 
board, 2016). Islamic banking has also increased in non-Islamic countries, such as the UK and 
France. In addition, China has developed special regulations to facilitate Islamic banking, and 
many conventional banks such as HSBS and Standard Chartered bank have opened Windows 
(i.e. small sections) to offer Islamic banking services to their Muslim clients. Therefore, it is 
important to know about the Islamic banking system, how it differs from conventional banking, 
whether it is more safe than conventional banking, and if it would be profitable for conventional 
banks to use some Islamic financial methods (Awan, 2009). 
 Like conventional banking (CB), Islamic banking (IB) is a trustee and mediator of people’s 
money. Conventional banking follows conventional interest-based principles, whereas Islamic 
banking follows Sharia laws, which includes a series of prohibitions (Jaffar & Manarvi, 2011) 
including: paying or receiving interest rate (called riba), gambling or speculating (maysir or 
gharar), and involvement with or working in industries who deal with products related to 
alcohol, pork, weapons and pornography (Gheeraert, 2014). This is in contrast to conventional 
banking, which does not forbid interest rates or working with products such as alcohol, weapons 
etc. Therefore, there is more interest today in understanding both types (IB vs CB) and the risk 
management for both types (Čihák & Hesse, 2008).  
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Since the financial crisis of 2008-09, banking stability has become vital to investors who want to 
keep their money in a safe bank. It is therefore important to research this area and understand 
whether or not Islamic banking is more stable than conventional banking, as well as if it would 
be possible for conventional banks to use Islamic finance methods to eliminate the weaknesses in 
their contracts and methods. Islamic banking offers products and goods that are similar to 
conventional banking products by replacing interest rates and discounting with fees and a 
contingent payment structure (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Merrouche, 2013; Trad, Trabelsi & 
Goux, 2017). 
Previously, several aspects of the differences between Islamic banking and conventional 
banking,  such as profitability, risk, stability, efficiency and performance, have been researched 
to determine which bank type is safer and has better performance theoretically. Studying the 
comparative banking structure is important in light of the significant number of banks in the 
economy. Furthermore, the increase in the number of Islamic banks and Islamic windows inside 
conventional banks all over the world makes it more interesting to investigate in this area (El 
Massah & Al-Sayed, 2015; Islam & Kozokov, 2009). However, there are not many empirical 
studies available comparing conventional banking and Islamic banking. This study therefore 
attempts to fill the gap in the empirical literature on conventional and Islamic banks by 
examining the comparative stability of Islamic banking and conventional banking during and 
after the last financial crisis.    
 
1.2: Aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether Islamic banks are more stable than conventional 
banks by addressing the following research questions: 1) Is there sufficient stability in such that 
they can remain strong during a crisis? and 2) Which elements, such as assets, leverage, return 
on assets (ROA) etc. add quality to the z-score? In order to answer these questions, the present 
study will compare five IBs with seven CBs and measure the stability of both types, during the 
period 2006-15 for the z-score. Also, the regression covers the period 2008-15 by using Panel 
model for Islamic and conventional banks, which covers the time during and after the crisis. 
Country-level variables will also be added to the bank variables in the regression to determine 
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the impact of each element on the z-score. The first comparison will provide a full picture of 
which type is more stable, after which the regression will elicit the significant variables.  
 
Overall, the present study finds that Islamic banks performed better during the last financial 
crisis, while conventional banks performed better and were more stable overall, and that there 
was no significant difference in stability between IB and CB. Moreover, leverage had a strong 
effect on overall stability regardless of the type of bank. In addition, Islamic banks were 
observed to be more affected after the first stage of the crisis, suggesting that Islamic banks are 
related to the real economy and invest in real products and services. The leverage of IB in this 
sample was also observed to be lower than the leverage of CB. Furthermore, when leverage was 
included into the regression, the assets (i.e. bank size) were found to be significant at 1% and 
strongly related to stability, suggesting a strong relationship between these two variables (when 
using z-score as a measure) and indicating the effect of assets which are financed by debt. Assets 
were found to be significant at 10% when leverage was excluded.      
  
 1.3: Limitations 
 
Due to the lack of access to databases, especially for Islamic banks, the main source of data in 
the present study is annual reports for each bank available on the banks’ website. Financial data 
was    not available for many banks. Therefore, this study covers 12 banks in four countries: 
UAE, Jordan, USA and Sweden, providing a diverse sample which includes different governance 
systems and regulations. Moreover, the regression covers the period 2008-15, which covers the 
crisis period and after the crisis.    
 
1.4: Thesis Outline 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 covers the introduction to the study. Chapter 
2 lays out the theoretical framework, while Chapter 3 discusses risks in Islamic and conventional 
banking. Chapter 4 will outline methodology and data, after which chapter 5 will present the 
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empirical analysis and results. Chapter 6 is the conclusion and Chapter 7 contains a list of 
references.  
  
 9 
Chapter 2: Theoretical review  
 
In terms of financial models, investment modes and contracts, Islamic banks are different from 
conventional banks. Therefore, governance structures, agency conflicts, and overall 
accountability are affected significantly by those differences (Abdelsalam et al. 2016). 
There are only a few financial studies that use empirical analysis of Islamic and conventional 
banking, Čihák and Hesse (2008) conducted an empirical study about the financial stability in 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. They used cross-country data for 70 banks with 520 
observations, of Islamic banks and conventional banks during the period 1993-2004 to capture 
the impact of bank size on the stability in Islamic banks and conventional banks. They used the 
z-score as a measure of stability and found that financially, small Islamic banks tend to be 
stronger than small conventional banks, large Islamic banks tend to be weaker than large 
conventional banks, and small Islamic banks tend to be stronger than large Islamic banks.  
Furthermore, in their study Islam and Kozokov (2009) used secondary data from the period 
2005-08 for 66 banks, and they used the z-score as a stability measure for both Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. They found that there was no significant difference in the stability of Islamic 
banks and conventional banks and that Islamic banks were not less risky than conventional banks 
even during the financial crises.  
Research conducted by Hasan and Dridi (2010) in which their sample included about 120 banks,    
found that before the financial crisis, IBs were more profitable than the CBs, and that for the 
period 2008-09, the average profitability of IBs was similar to that of CBs. Moreover, large IBs 
performed better than smaller ones. Furthermore, during the crisis, the credit and asset growth of 
Islamic banks was at least twice high as that of CBs. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2010) describe the most common Islamic banking 
products, and they compared the business orientation, quality, cost-efficiency and stability of 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. They found that Islamic banks were more cost-effective 
in a large sample of countries, while conventional banks were more cost-effective than Islamic 
banks in countries where both types exist. They also found that Islamic banks had a higher 
capitalasset ratio. Moreover, the efficiency and stability for both types differ between countries; 
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thus, they concluded that Islamic banks are more stable but less cost-effective than conventional 
banks in countries where the market share of Islamic banks is higher. 
In another study Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2013) compared the business model, 
efficiency, and asset quality of Islamic banks and conventional banks using a sample of 22 
countries. Their study covered period during and after the last financial crisis. Their empirical 
study showed that there were few significant differences in the business model, and that Islamic 
banks were less efficient, but had higher intermediation ratios. Moreover, Islamic banks had 
higher asset quality were better capitalized. Furthermore, they found that asset quality and higher 
capitalization helped Islamic banks to perform better during the last financial crisis.  
Kabir, Worthington and Gupta (2015) investigated credit risk in both Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. They used Merton’s distance-to-default (DD) model. They found that in 
general, depending on the DD model, Islamic banks had a lower credit risk than their 
counterparts. Conversely, Islamic banks had a lower z-score and higher NPLs (Nonperforming 
loan/ assets) than conventional banks, suggesting that Islamic banks had a higher credit risk. 
They did not find any significant difference in credit risk during the financial crisis, however, 
which refutes the findings of previous studies that Islamic banks performed better during the 
crisis.  
2.1- Islamic bank model  
 
Islamic banks work under Islamic laws (Sharia), which forbid working with interest rate and 
loans trading (Čihák & Hesse, 2008; Ghassan, Fachin & Guendoz, 2012). 
 2.1.1: Overview of Islamic banks  
Islamic banking is a system of banking which works according to Sharia which refers to   Islamic 
laws which came from the Islamic religion. Under these laws, Islamic banks prohibit interest 
rates on deposits and collecting interest when offering loans; this process is called Riba in the 
Islam religion. Instead, Islamic banking uses other ways and contracts, such as: profit-and-loss 
sharing  (PLS) arrangements, when the banks contribute a business by offering the capital and 
share the profit and loss in that business, and purchase and resale transactions (goods and 
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services), which  are the main forms of Islamic banking contracts. In PLS, the rate of return is 
not known or fixed before embarking on the transaction. Moreover, Islamic banking prohibits 
trading in financial risk (which is seen as a form of gambling, which is forbidden) and in a 
business that involves alcohol, gambling activities, or non-Islamic media. Therefore, Islamic 
banks have to take some risk to make their profit compliant with Sharia and do not work with 
products that harm human beings (Čihák & Hesse, 2008; Ghassan, Fachin & Guendoz, 2013). 
Customers of Islamic banks are not different from the conventional banks’ customers, as they 
expect their money to be productive and safe when they deposit it in the bank. They want to 
invest their money in goods and activities that are allowed in Islamic laws and they want to be 
safe from financial crisis and fraudulent practices. Ethical values and moral integrity are very 
important in Islamic banking, as they are the key for the stability and efficiency of the banks and 
the financial system, and they attract investors, especially Muslim investors who are searching 
for investments that are compliant with Islamic laws. Islamic banks are not only for Muslim 
communities, but also for all communities, so they are additional choices available for 
customers. Additional choices can play an effective role in improving the quality of services and 
improving social welfare (Khan & Muljawan, 2003). 
Stability, equitable distribution of wealth and income, economic growth, economic well-being 
with full employment, and the mobilization and of savings for economic development guarantee 
a (profit-sharing) return is to all parties involved (ed. Hassan, & Lewis, 2007). In addition, to the 
fact that Islamic banks offer a variety of religiously acceptable financial services to Muslim 
communities, like other aspects of Islamic society, Islamic banks try to achieve socio-economic 
development (Chapra, 1985). Consequently, Islamic banks have the same goals as conventional 
banks and additional goals, and they try to achieve those goals by following Islamic laws and 
applying Islamic finance tools.  
2.2: Islamic banking contracts  
Islamic banks have different forms of contracts, in particular Murabaha, Mudarabah, 
Musharakah, Ijara, Sukuk and Takaful. 
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2.2.1: Murabaha contract 
Murabaha is a contract where the bank buys an asset or goods from a third party, and resells 
those purchases to a second party (could be individual or company) with an amount of profit 
agreed between the bank and the second party. The difference between this contract and 
conventional interest-based lending is that if the second party fails to make a deferred payment 
on time, the mark-up (the profit which was agreed on) will not increase from and the bank itself 
become the owner of the product which means it carries the associated risks. Example on 
Murabaha contract, when a person wants to buy a car which costs 10000$ so he goes to the bank 
and the bank buy the car and resell it to that person in installments and charge a flat fee (ed. 
Hassan, & Lewis, 2007; Khan & Bhatti, 2008). 
 2.2.2: Mudaraba contract (finance by way of trust) 
This term refers to a form of partnership which one partner (rabb al-mal) brings the capital and 
the other party (mudarib) brings personal effort (skills) and manage the capital. The bank can 
provide the full capital or part of it. The investor bears the risk, so if the investment goes 
bankrupt the bank will lose the capital and the other party will lose the work and the effort. 
Mudaraba enter both sides of the balance sheet on the asset side, as project financings and on 
liability side as investment. Moreover, the mudarib (other party) has the option to buy the 
investment from the investor (the bank) (ed. Hassan, & Lewis, 2007). 
2.2.3: Musharakah contract 
It is a contract between the bank and the customer whereby the Islamic bank offer the capital to 
an enterprise, and the enterprise might be existing or new either on a permanent or temporary 
basis. If the contract is temporary, one partner promises to buy the equity from the other party 
gradually until the title of the equity is completed. While if the contract of Musharakah is 
permanent, the bank manages the enterprise and search for ways to develop the project’s profit 
(El Tiby, 2011).  
The possible risks for this contract is credit risk which the bank might loss their share in capital 
which invested in the project or credit risk related to the payment that the customers would pay 
to the bank. Operational risk rises up when there is insufficient management during the life of the 
project, and this risk usually happen as a result of the lack of experience or the bank is not 
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involved in managing the project or follow it is financial reports. To avoid this risk, the bank is 
required to follow the project and take the right decision at the right time (El Tiby, 2011). 
2.2.4: Ijarah contract  
Ijarah contract means hiring or leasing. It is an agreement between the Islamic bank and the 
customer, and by this agreement the bank lease an asset to the customer who has the right to 
benefit from the asset on an agreed rental over a period of time.  
Possible risks for this contract is credit risk, when the customer (lessee) is unable to serve the 
lease rental when it is due. Market risk could be a possible risk if the customer defaults, in this 
case the bank might dispose of the asset at the market price, which might be lower than the 
agreed price. Operational risk happens when the customer (lessee) use the asset in activities that 
are not legal in Shariah principles, such as selling cigarettes or alcohol (El Tiby, 2011) 
2.2.5: Sukuk (Islamic bonds) 
Sukuk is a financial certificate, it is Islamic bonds as an alternative to conventional bonds. Sukuk 
according to the accounting and auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions 
(AAOIFI), is “an Islamic investment certificate which represents an undivided beneficial 
ownership of an underlying asset which grants investors a share of an asset along with the cash 
flows and risk commensurate with such ownership” (ed. Hassan, & Lewis, 2007). Table 1 
describes the difference between Islamic Sukuk and conventional bond. 
 Table 1: Distinguish between Islamic Sukuk and conventional bond. Source: (Jamaldeen & Faleel, 
2012). 
 Islamic Sukuk Conventional bonds 
Asset 
ownership 
Sukuk give the investor partial 
ownership in the asset on which 
the sukuk are based. 
Bonds do not give the investor a share of 
ownership in the asset, project, business, or 
joint venture they support. 
They are a debt obligation from the issuer to 
the bond 
holder 
Investment  The asset on which sukuk are 
based must be sharia-compliant. 
Generally, bonds can be used to finance any 
asset, project, business, or joint venture that 
complies with local legislation 
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criteria 
Issue unit 
Each sukuk represents a share of 
the underlying asset. 
Each bond represents a share of debt. 
Issue price 
The face value of sukuk is based 
on the market value of the 
underlying asset. 
The face value of a bond price is based on 
the issuer’s 
credit worthiness (including its rating). 
 
Investment 
rewards and 
risks 
Sukuk holders receive a share of 
profits from the underlying 
asset (and accept a share of any 
loss incurred). 
Bond holders receive regularly scheduled 
(and often fixed rate) interest payments for 
the life of the bond, and their principal is 
guaranteed to be returned at the bond’s 
maturity date. 
Effects of 
costs 
Sukuk holders are affected by 
costs related to the underlying 
asset. Higher costs may translate 
to lower investor profits and vice 
versa. 
Bond holders generally are not affected by 
costs related to the asset, project, business, 
or joint venture they support. 
 
2.2.6: Takaful (Islamic insurance)  
 
Taken literally, Takaful means “mutual or joint guarantee”, and it is used to denote Islamic 
insurance. Typically, Takaful takes the form of Mudarabah, where two parties agree to share 
their losses by contributing periodic premiums in the form of investments (Greuning, & Iqbal, 
2008). Islamic laws prohibit life insurance, as is offered by conventional banks, due to the 
uncertainty, doubt, probability and charging of interest involved. In comparison, Takaful is a 
free-interest contract (Khan & Coopers, 2008). Table 2 outlines the difference between Takaful 
insurance and conventional insurance. 
Table 2: Difference between Islamic insurance and conventional insurance. Source: (Greuning & Iqbal, 
2008). 
 Takaful insurance Conventional insurance 
Benefits 
Paid from the related participants’ funds under 
mutual assistance. 
 
Paid from the company reserves. 
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The funds shall be invested in any interest-free 
Shari’a-approved assets and also meet any required 
national insurance regulations and laws. 
 
The funds may be invested in any 
assets so long as they meet 
required national insurance 
regulations and laws. 
 
Operations 
 
Operational mechanisms shall be in line with the 
Shari’a rules. 
 
 
 
Operational mechanisms shall be 
in line with the national insurance 
regulations and laws. 
 
Profit 
Underwriting profit is distributed to the 
policyholders. Shareholders’ profit is generated 
from the return on the investments of the 
shareholder capital and expenses paid to the 
shareholders by the policyholders for (i) managing 
the company on behalf of the policyholders; and (ii) 
managing the policyholders’ investment funds on 
behalf of the policyholders. 
 
Policyholders do not get any share 
of the underwriting profit (except 
in mutual companies); 
shareholders’ profit is generated 
from the company’s underwriting 
profit plus any investment returns. 
 
Company 
Company is better known as an operator, which acts 
as a trustee, manager and also entrepreneur. 
 
Relationship between the 
company and the policyholders is 
on one to one basis. 
 
Policyholder 
Fund 
The policyholder fund belongs to the policyholders 
on collective basis and is managed by the 
shareholders. 
 
All (ie. both policyholder and 
shareholder) funds belong to the 
company, though separation of 
assets may be maintained between 
shareholders and policyholders for 
specific insurances (eg. with 
profits). 
 
Regulations 
The operational mechanisms and products must be 
Shari’a-compliant and be in accordance with 
required national laws and insurance regulations. 
 
Operational mechanisms and 
products have to be in accordance 
with the required national laws 
and insurance regulations. 
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2.3: The difference between Islamic and Conventional banking  
The Islamic banking system is based on the act of making profits under the Shariah principles of 
Islam. Conventional banks rely on man-made laws and focus on maximizing profits. The 
fundamental concept behind conventional banks’ practices is to lend money and get it back later, 
charging high interest to generate profit (Sabir et al. 2014). Conventional banks receive interest 
on the loans they provide to investors; the banks do not take part in the investor’s business. 
Whether a business makes a profit or a loss, the bank still receives interest according to the 
original agreement. 
 In comparison, in Islamic banking the bank is part of the business. It gets back only a share of 
the profit from the business to which the bank has provide funds. In the case of any loss 
occurring, the business party (that is, the investor) does not lose out in monetary terms, rather the 
business forgoes the reward for its activities during that period. Therefore, the depositors are 
seen as investors in the company, although they do not participate in risk management, with 
shareholders contributing to risk management. Conversely, in conventional banks the investors 
usually own the investment and contribute to risk management costs; unless the bank is a part of 
the business, in which case then both sides would contribute to risk management. (Sabir et al. 
2014; Shaban et al. 2013; Arnu & Turner, 2003). 
Greuning, and Iqbal (2008) mentioned that understanding the balance sheet of a financial 
institution is important approach and a good point to start to understand the risk management of 
the financial institution. Table (3,4) indicates the balance sheets of Islamic and conventional 
banking. 
Table 3: balance sheet of CB, source: (Greuning, and Iqbal, 2008). 
Assets  Liabilities  
Loans and advances to customers  Customers’ deposits  
Cash and cash balances with other banks  Due to banks and other financial institutions  
Investments in associates, subsidiaries and joint ventures  Other liabilities  
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Financial assets held for trading  Sundry creditors  
Cash and cash balances with the central bank  Equity and reserves  
  
 
 Table 4: balance sheet of IB, source: (Greuning, and Iqbal, 2008). 
Application of funding  Sources of funding  
Cash balances  Demand deposits (amanah)  
Financing assets (murabaha, salam, ijara, istisna)  Investment accounts (mudarabah)  
Investment assets (mudarabah, musharakah)  
Special investment accounts (mudarabah, 
musharakah)  
Fee-based services (ju’ala, kafala, and so forth)  Reserves  
Non-banking assets (property)  Equity capital  
  
From the tables above it is apparent that the risk profile of an Islamic bank’s balance sheet is 
different to that of conventional banks. This is because the return on the depositors’ investments 
when working with an Islamic bank is linked to the return on their assets. Moreover, the assets 
belonging to the two institutions are different; conventional banks tend to stay with fixed 
income, very low credit-risk debt securities, whereas an Islamic bank’s assets are focused on 
asset-based investments. These have credit risk and are also backed by real assets; therefore, the 
lending capacity of Islamic banks depends upon the state of the real assets in the wider economy. 
In addition, the conventional banks’ assets are financed by a loan from the bank to the customer; 
in Islamic banks, the asset and the financing are coupled together (Greuning, & Iqbal, 2008). 
The governance of Islamic banks is different to that of conventional banks, not only as regards 
the status of the depositors, but in the presence and construction of the Shariah boards in Islamic 
banks. The Shariah board’s priority is to ensure that all business activities conducted by the bank 
complies with Islamic law and principles. Figure (1) compares the typical governance structure 
of both conventional and Islamic banks. 
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Figure 1: Stylized governance structures of conventional and Islamic bank. Source: (ed. Hassan, & 
Lewis,2007). 
 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial institutions (AAOIFI) issued 
the governance standards of Shariah board, on the ‘Shariah supervisory board: appointments, 
composition and report’ and explained Shariah board as:  
a- Is an independent body of specialized jurisits in fiqh almua’malat (Islamic commercial     
jurisprudence). 
b- Is entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the 
Islamic financial institutions in order to ensure that they are in compliance with Islamic 
Sharia rules and principles.  
c- Can issue fatwas
  
and rulings which shall be binding on the Islamic financial institution. 
d- d-  Shall consist of at least three members’ who are appointed by the shareholders upon 
the recommendation of the board of directors.   
e- Shall prepare a report on the compliance of all contracts, transactions and dealings with 
the Shariah rules and principles (ed. Hassan, & Lewis, 2007). 
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Chapter 3: Risks in Islamic and conventional banks 
 
“Risk can be defined as an unplanned event with financial consequences resulting in loss or 
reduced earnings” (Vasavada et al. 2005). “Risk also refer to uncertainties resulting in adverse 
outcome, adverse in relation to planned objective” (Kumar et al. 2005).  
Risk can be classified into two types: systematic risk and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk 
usually refers to the market and the economy; this risk can not be diversified. Unsystematic risk 
usually relates to specific companies; this risk can be diversified (Allen & Santomero, 1998). 
Figure (2) shows the different categories of banking risk. 
Figure 2: Categories of Banking Risks 1, source: (Vyas & Singh, 2010). 
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 Table 5: Major risks faced by IB. Source: (Rosly & Zaini, 2008). 
 
Product based on  
 
Major risks  
 
Risk classification  
Murabahah  Credit risk  Unsystematic  
Musharakah  Market and agency risk  Systematic  
Mudarabah  Market and agency risk  Systematic  
Ijarah thumma al-bay’  Credit risk  Unsystematic  
Ijara wa iktina  
Operational and payment 
risk  
Unsystematic  
Salam  Delivery risk  Systematic  
Istisna’  Delivery risk  Systematic  
Bay’al-enah  Credit risk  Unsystematic  
Tawarruq  Credit risk  Unsystematic  
Commodity murabahah  
  
Credit risk  
  
Unsystematic  
  
  
 
We can see from the table 5 above that Murabaha in Islamic banks faces credit risk. This 
happens when the bank delivers the asset to the other party but does not receive payments from 
the other party (that is, the investor) on time. In Salam contracts the investor can benefit from the 
fact that the bank will not charge them for any delayed payments; therefore, the bank could face 
this kind of delivery risk. However, in some cases the bank uses collateral as a security with 
which to reduce credit risk. In the table below we can see the level of the risk for each contract 
that might be held by Islamic banks. 
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 Table 6: Risks in different of financing.  Source: (ed. Hassan, & Lewis, 2007). 
 
 
Credit risk  
 
Market risk  
 
Liquidity risk  
 
Operational risk  
Murabaha  2.47 (17) 2.75  (12) 2.62  (16) 2.8  (15) 
Mudarabah  3.38  (13) 3.56  (9) 2.57  (14) 2.92  (13) 
Musharakah  3.71 (14) 3.67  (9) 3.0   (13) 3.08  (12) 
Ijarah  2.64  (14) 3.17  (6) 3.1   (10) 2.9   (10) 
Istisna  3.13 (8) 2.75  (4) 3.0    (6) 3.29  (7) 
Salam  
3.2  (5) 
  
3.25  (4) 
  
3.2    (5) 
  
3.25  (4) 
  
The number of respondents are indicated in the parentheses 
The table 6 above shows some important risks in Islamic banks. We can see here that credit risk 
is considered to be lowest in Murabaha (2.47) contracts, with the highest risk experience by 
Musharakah (3.71). Ijarah (2.64) has the second-lowest credit risk, while Istisna (3.13) and 
Salam (3.2) are riskier than all the other contracts except Musharakah in terms of credit risk.  
It appears that contracts involving profit and loss sharing experience higher credit risk. This is 
for two main reasons. Firstly, because sometimes the other party does not pay its obligations to 
the bank. Secondly, it can occur when the bank acts as a financier of the project but does not 
contribute to its management and thereby is not involved in managing credit risk. In Ijarah and 
Murabaha contracts, the other party gives the bank a relatively certain income and the ownership 
of the least asset remains with the bank. Salam and Istisna are riskier than Murabaha contracts 
because the value of the product (and hence the return) at the end of the contract is uncertain. 
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This may be the case for many reasons, such as a natural disaster (commodities feature in Salam 
contracts) and production failures (applicable to Istisna contracts).  
Murabaha (2.75) and Istisna (2.75) appear to be the lowest in terms of market risk; conversely, 
this risk is high for the profit-sharing contracts (Musharakah (3.67) and Mudarabah (3.56)). This 
shows that contracts that are related to equity, assets and commodity are higher risk than other 
contracts, such as Murabaha. 
Mudarabah (2.57) appears to experience the least liquidity risk, with Murabaha (2.62) coming 
straight after. These are usually used for short-term finance. The other instruments are 
considered to have a higher liquidity risk: Musharakah (3.0), Ijarah (3.1), Salam (3.2) and 
Istisna (3.0). It appears that liquidity risk is lower in short-term financing contracts and higher in 
long-term contracts.  
. Murabaha (2.8), Mudarabah (2.92), and Ijarah (2.9) are considered to experience lower levels 
of operational risk, while product-deferred instruments such as Salam (3.25) and Istisna (3.29) 
are considered to have higher operational risks. Profit-sharing contracts such as Musharakah 
(3.08) also have fairly high operational risk (ed. Hassan, & Lewis, 2007). 
The risks faced by Islamic banks are complex and difficult to mitigate compared to those faced 
by conventional banks. The significant market and credit risks inherent in Islamic banking exist 
due to its regulation by Shariah laws (Khan & Ahmed, 2001). However, Arrifin, Archer and 
Karim (2009) argue that Islamic and conventional banks face the same types of risks, but that it 
is the level of risk that differs between Islamic and conventional banks. In addition, risk 
measurement techniques for Islamic banks are not advanced as those employed by conventional 
banks. The figure below shows the shared and unique risks in conventional and Islamic banking. 
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Figure 3: shared and unique risks in CB & IB. Source: (Kozarevic, Nuhanovic &Nurikic, 2013). 
 
  
Credit risk in conventional banks relates to the banks’ lending activities In the case of Islamic 
banks, the lending process is replaced with investment and partnership contracts, therefore, 
credit risk management becomes more important.  
 Credit risk occurs in Islamic banking when the counterparty fails to meets its obligations 
according to the agreed terms. Each type of contract held by Islamic banks (Musharakah, 
Mudarabah and Ijarah) as well as the working capital financing transactions (such as Salam, 
Istisna and Mudarabah) poses a different credit risk to the bank’s profits (Misman, & Bhatti, 
2010). 
3.1.1: Credit risks 
 
Credit risks are higher in Murabaha contracts due to its necessary compliance with Shariah laws. 
Additionally, the nature of the contract has an impact on credit risk in Murabaha contracts, 
because the buyer has the right to refuse the product purchased by the bank. Moreover, the bank 
will expose both market and price risks as a result of the credit risk faced (Abdul Rehman, 2016). 
Banks also face credit risk in Mudarabah contracts because the bank acts as a financier of the 
business and does not contribute to the management of the project.  
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3.1.2: Market risk 
 
Market risks occur when unfavorable movements happen to the market prices. Interest rate risks, 
foreign exchange risks, equity risks and commodity risks are all examples of market risk.  
3.1.3: Liquidity risk 
 
Liquidity risks arise when the banks are unable to pay their liabilities due to a mismatch between 
the maturity of the assets and the liabilities. This risk is considered to be the main one to which 
banks are exposed. Liquidity risks include funding risks, time risks and call risks. 
 
 3.1.4: Operational risks 
Operational risks occur as a result of a failure in the system. Technology, inadequate procedures 
and the weak internal processes of Islamic banks are all susceptible. Legal, fiduciary and 
reputational risks are included under the term operational risk. Rate-of-return risk arises because 
of uncertainty regarding return on investment (ROI) in Islamic banking.  
 
3.1: Risks specific to Islamic banking 
There are some risks that exist only in Islamic banking, because of its nature and the laws it 
follows. 
 
3.1.1: Displaced commercial risk  
According to (AAOIFI) and Abdul Rehman (2016) displaced commercial risk arises when 
Islamic banks face problems to pay its investors and depositors a higher rate of return than that 
which should be paid under the real contract. This risk happens when a bank has underperformed 
for a period and remains unable to generate enough profits for its account holders and investors. 
3.1.2: Governance risk  
This risk occurs as a result of a failure to govern the institution. Negligence in terms of the 
administration of contracts, an inability to meet its obligations and a weak internal and external 
environment can all play a part. Governance risk includes legal risks, which is the term for when 
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banks are unable to fulfil their contracts (Greuning, & Iqbal, 2008). 
3.1.3: Withdrawal risk  
This risk arises from the competitive pressures faced by the Islamic banks both from other 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. The bank faces this risk when the investors withdraw 
their funds when they earn lower rate of return than would be get from another banks (Khan & 
Ahmed, 2001). 
3.1.4: Fiduciary risk 
This risk arises when banks are not able to perform according to both the explicit and implicit 
standards regulating their fiduciary responsibilities. This risk includes that of legal action, if the 
bank were to violate its fiduciary responsibilities to depositors and shareholders. From a 
fiduciary agent’s view, Islamic banks are expected to achieve their best for depositors and 
shareholders. If the objectives of depositors and shareholders do not match with the banks’ and 
differ from the bank’s actions, the bank is exposed to fiduciary risk (Greuning, & Iqbal, 2008). 
3.1.5: Transparency risk 
It is defined as “the public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users of that 
information to make an accurate assessment of a bank’s financial condition and performance, 
business activities, risk profile, and risk management practices” and it happens due to bad 
decisions because of incomplete information. Islamic bank contracts reported from nonstandard 
conventions and this could be one source of lack of transparency. Moreover, Islamic bank’s 
financial instruments needs and require different conventions of reporting to reflect the true 
financial picture of the bank (Greuning, & Iqbal, 2008; Abdul Rehman, 2016).  
3.2- Main differences in Islamic and conventional banks  
 
Table 7: Differences between Islamic & Conventional banks. Source: (Zaharuddin Hj Abd Rahman, 
2007). 
Conventional banking 
 
Islamic banking 
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1. The functions and operating modes of 
conventional banks are based on man-made 
principles.  
 
1. The functions and operating modes of Islamic banks 
are based on the principles of Islamic Shariah.  
 
 2. The investor is assured of a 
predeter- mined rate of interest.  
 
2. In contrast, it promotes risk sharing between provider 
of capital (investor) and the user of funds (entrepreneur).  
 
3. It aims to maximize profit without any 
restriction.  
 
3. It also aims to maximize profit, but subject to Shariah 
restrictions.  
 
4. It does not deal with zakah.  
 
4. In the modern Islamic banking sys- tem, it has become 
one of the ser- vice-oriented functions of the Islamic 
banks to collect and dis- tribute zakah.  
 
5. Lending money and getting it back with 
interest is the fundamental function of the 
conventional banks.  
 
5. Participation in partnership business is the 
fundamental function of the Islamic banks.  
 
6. Its scope of activities is narrower when 
compared with an Islamic bank.  
 
6. Its scope of activities is wider when compared with a 
conventional bank. It is, in effect, a multipur- pose 
institution.  
 
7. It can charge additional money (compound 
rate of interest) in case of defaulters.  
 
7. The Islamic banks have no provision to charge any 
extra money from the defaulters.  
 
8. In it, the bank’s own interest very often 
becomes prominent. It makes no effort to 
ensure growth with equity.  
 
8. It gives due importance to the public interest. Its 
ultimate aim is to ensure growth with equity.  
 
9. For interest-based commercial banks, 
borrowing from the money market is 
relatively easier.  
 
9. For Islamic banks, it is comparatively difficult to 
borrow money from the money market.  
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11. Conventional banks place greater 
emphasis on creditworthiness of the clients.  
 
11. Islamic banks, on the other hand, place greater 
emphasis on the via- bility of the projects.  
 
 
12. The status of a conventional bank in 
relation to its clients is that of creditor and 
debtors.  
 
12. The status of the Islamic bank in relation to its 
clients is that of part- ners, investors, and traders.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Data 
In order to get a clear picture of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks, both qualitative 
and quantitative techniques used. Former parts discussed theoretically the difference between 
both types (IB & CB) and the latter part will discuss empirically the difference between the two 
distinct banking system by using the data for both types to calculate z-score, ROA, leverage, and 
analyze the regression. Both methodology combination makes it easer and more clear to observe 
which type is more stable or riskier. 
4.1: Data collection 
This study relies on data that has been collected from the banks’ balance sheets, which can be 
found on each bank’s website. This data has been used to calculate the return on assets (ROA), 
leverage and z-score for each bank, covering 10 years between 2006 and 2015. Country-level 
data such as GDP growth and the inflation rate has collected from websites belonging to 
organizations such as Federal Reserve Economic Data by the Federal Reserve Bank (FRED), 
Trading Economics and The World Bank. 
4.2: The sample and selection criteria  
The selection of Islamic banks in this study primarily comes from countries in the Gulf region. 
The sample does not cover the full range of Islamic and conventional banks worldwide; rather, it 
covers four countries. It is hoped that a comparison of specific banks will give a more in-depth 
understanding as to what affects the stability of each type of bank, in that it will allow us to find 
the elements or variables that add quality or improve stability.  
It is worth noting that country-level data varies between countries, which might affect the results. 
For example, one entry such as liquidity or assets might have a different impact on a bank’s 
stability in different countries.  
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Ten years’ worth of data from five Islamic banks has been collected, of which four are located in 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and one in Jordan. Their annual reports confirm that they are 
properly Islamic banks. In additional, ten years’ worth of data has been collected from seven 
conventional banks from the United States, as well as from two Swedish banks. 
The UAE is the heart of the economy in the Gulf region. It is an open market that attracts 
investors from all over the world. The first Islamic banks were founded in Dubai, thus, it is 
reasonable to include Islamic banks from this country. One Jordanian Islamic bank has been 
included, because although there are additional Islamic banks in the UAE these are smaller, with 
limited data. Jordan is a neighbor of the UAE and the size of the Jordanian bank is comparable to 
that of the four from the UAE.  
 
The United States (US) is the heart of the world’s economy. The biggest conventional banks are 
located there and the financial crises started in the US. Therefore, US conventional banks are 
sensible to use when constructing an empirical analysis to compare conventional with Islamic 
banking. Two Swedish banks were added in order to distinguish the Islamic dummy in the 
regression analysis.  
This study contains 96 observations: 40 observations concerning Islamic banks and 56 
concerning conventional banks. There are some outliers that were excluded because they are far 
away from the mean (Čihák & Hesse, 2008); the sample is more balanced without outliers.  
4.3: Specifying bank stability  
Unlike previous research, this essay compares the stability of five Islamic banks and seven 
conventional banks. In order to measure bank stability, the banks’ z-score, leverage and ROA 
have been used to construct an empirical comparison. The aim is to find which elements add 
strength to each bank’s z-score.  
4.3.1: Z-score 
The z-score is one of the most important measures of a bank’s stability. This measure is directly 
related to the probability of the bank’s insolvency, which occurs when the value of the bank’s 
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debt becomes higher than the value of its assets. The z-score can be calculated using equation (1) 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2008). 
𝑍 =
k+ μ
𝜎
                                                                                                                                  (1) 
Where k is the equity capital as percent of assets,  is the return as a percentage of the assets and 
 is the standard deviation of ROA. Therefore, the z-score connects the bank’s capital with its 
ROA and its risks (volatility of returns). The z-score also indicates the standard deviation of how 
far the bank’s asset returns have to fall before the bank becomes insolvent. Thus, the z-score is 
the bank’s distance from insolvency; a higher z-score implies that the bank is more stable and 
therefore has a lower probability of insolvency risk.  
 The z-score can be applied to both Islamic banks and conventional banks, because it is a fairly 
objective measure of safety across different financial groups. Furthermore, the z-score is not 
affected by the bank’s activities nor its insolvency, whereas other measures might signal a 
liquidity problem. (Ghassan, Fachin & Guendoz, 2013; Li, Tripe & Malone, 2017).
 
The z-score method has a possible failing; namely, that it displays the book value of the capital 
and reserves and so could therefore underestimate the financial strength of the Islamic banks. 
Financial liabilities in Islamic banks consist of investment accounts that can be seen as a form of 
equity (in general, this is based on the Mudaraba principle). A possible counterargument against 
this criticism is that the conventional banks can pass on risks to their customers through their 
ability to adjust (and delay adjustments in) loan rates and deposits (Čihák & Hesse, 2010). 
 
4.3.2: Leverage:  
 
The leverage ratio or debt/equity ratio is used to measure the bank’s financial leverage. It 
indicates how much debt a bank is using to finance its assets and can be calculated using 
equation (2).  
Leverage =
Total liabilities
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
                                                                                                      (2) 
 31 
This ratio measures the bank’s overall leverage; it is the best-known measure of capital 
adequacy. The higher the leverage, the greater the risk being accepted by creditors; a lower 
leverage indicates greater long-term financial safety. In general, creditors prefer a low leverage 
ratio because it provides protection for the bank (Arunachalam, 2006).
 
 
4.3.3: Return on assets (ROA) 
 
This is a profitability ratio widely used by financial institutions. It measures the efficiency of the 
company when generating profits. This ratio displays the ability of the bank to utilize its assets 
(Hossan & Habib, 2010). 
ROA =
Net income
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
                                                                                             (3)
 
This ratio is used for both kind of banks (conventional and Islamic) and it is based on the net 
income that a bank makes from its total assets. ROA indicates how much income the financial 
institution generates from it is assets; the higher the ROA, the better it is, because that means that 
the bank can generate more profit from its assets. ROA is also a good tool for investors, as it 
allows them to have an idea as to what extent the company it effectively converting their money 
into net income (Heikal, Khaddafi & Ummah, 2014). 
In addition to the measures above, outliers are calculated by estimating the first quartile, third 
quartile and calculate the outlier by using the equations: 
Lower bound = first quartile – 1.5 * IQR; Upper bound = third quartile + 1.5* IQR, where IQR is 
interquartile ranges. Therefore, the outliers are the values outside the range of (lower bound – 
upper bound) for the z-scores. The values of the upper and lower bounds available in the table 9 
below which are based on the tables (11,14) in Appendix.  
 
4.4- Control Variables
 
 
A number of control variables which cover the bank and country level, are used for analysis. The 
control variables are based on my calculation, z-score are calculated as equation (1), leverage is 
calculated as equation (2), ROA is calculated as equation (3) and this is due to the lack of data 
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especially for Islamic banks. In the analysis, I included ROA (profitability), leverage (solvency 
ratio), assets (bank size) as bank level control variables. While I included GDP growth and 
inflation rate as country level control which are collected from Federal Reserve bank economic 
data (FRED), trading economics and world bank.  
In order to recognize the impact of bank type on the z-score, I included a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the bank is Islamic bank, and 0 if commercial bank (Čihák & Hesse, 2008).  
4.5: Regression Analysis
 
Regression is a statistical technique used in finance to determine how strong is the relation 
between one variable (dependent variable) and a series of other variables (independent 
variables). Regression helps economists to explore how strong the dependent variable is affected 
by each independent variable. Since, my data is both cross-sectional (12 banks) and time-series 
(2006-15). I used Panel data analysis, which is consistent with many scholars (Čihák & Hesse, 
2008; Kabir, Worthington & Gupta, 2015; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Merrouche, 2013). 
The panel data is more accurate and contains more sample variability than cross-sectional data. 
Also, the panel can control heterogeneity and can measure effects that can not be measured in 
cross-section or time-analysis ( Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2013).  
4.5.1- Regression model 
The output of the regression is tested in statistical package EViews. The z-score is taken as 
dependent variable, with three bank level vector variables and two country level variables. It is 
measured as in the following equation:  
Zi,j,t =  +1(Bank level control)I,j,t +2 (Country level control)j,t +3 (Islamic 
dummy)I +I,j,t                                                                                                                         (4) 
Where Zi,j,t  is the risk measure (Z-score) for bank I, in country j, at time t. 1(Bank level control) 
is a vector of bank level control variables (assets, leverage, ROA). 2(country level control) is a 
vector of country variables (GDP growth, inflation rate). 3(Islamic dummy) is included to 
distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks and it takes the value of 1 for Islamic banks 
and 0 for conventional banks. I,j,t is a residual.  
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Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis and results 
By looking at the results of the z-scores for the Islamic banks, it can be seen that there is high 
variability across the sample. Z-score values vary between 5.8 to 312.41, which reflects that 
there are outliers in the z-scores. Without outliers, the variability is between 5.8 to 41.15. 
Therefore, in the table 8 below we can see z-scores with and without outliers for both types of 
banks (i.e. Islamic and conventional). In conventional banks, there is no significant volatility in 
the z-score value; this is because large banks usually do not have outliers. The results of the table 
(8) and Figures (4, 6, 7) are the average results of the tables (11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16) in Appendix 
below. The tables in Appendix are calculated from equation (1) for the z-score, (2) for leverage 
and (3) for ROA.  
 
Table 8: Summary statistics. Source: author’s calculations based on balance sheets data 
 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max Observation 
Measures IB CB IB CB IB CB IB CB IB CB 
Z-score 72.15 23.03 102.17 12.03 5.27 10.05 312.89 48.33 40 56 
Z-score* 22.95 23.03 10.77 12.03  5.27 10.05 41.15 48.33 32 56 
ROA 0.012  0.01 0.0007 0.0012 -0.01 -0.006 0.025 0.053 40 56 
Leverage 6.41 12.67 2.78 4.86 2.73 7.27 14.98 28.98 40 56 
*Excluding Outliers  **Islamic banks ***Conventional banks 
 
Table 9: Upper and lower bound of the z-score. Source: author’s calculation 
 Islamic bank Conventional banks Observation 
Upper bound 61.76 76.35 40 
Lower bound 1.90 4.58 40 
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 Table 8 above shows that on average, Islamic banks and conventional banks are quite similar to  
each other in terms of of their z-scores (stability) when outliers are excluded. The empirical 
results would be significantly different if outliers were included because some Islamic banks 
have very high z-scores; therefore, it is important to account for outliers to get suitable and 
realistic results. Moreover, the variability in the z-score in the case of Islamic banks ( 41.15-
5.27)  is less than that of conventional banks (48.33-10.05), resulting in an overall z-score 
volatility of 10.77% for Islamic banks and 12.03% for conventional banks. This is because  
Islamic banks prohibit working and investing in highly-leveraged or speculative businesses and 
operations which are not based on tangible assets. These results are consistent with the findings 
of  Islam & Kozokov (2009).  
The figures (4, 6, 7) below explain how the z-score, leverage and ROA performed during 2006-
15 for Islamic banks and conventional banks.  
Figure 4: Average z-score for IB & CB. Source: author’s calculations. 
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Figure 5: Banks’ average z-score for UAE & US. Source: FRED  
 
 Figure 4 shows that IB had a lower average z-score than CB except in 2008-09. In 2008, z-score 
of CB decreased by around 10% compared to an 0% decrease in IB. This is because IB were not 
directly affected by the last financial crisis 2008-09, since IB adheres to Islamic laws which 
depend on profit-loss sharing and investment in real goods and services. This suggests, and 
figure 6 confirms, that the ROA for IB is higher than the ROA for CB in 2008-09. Moreover, IB 
forbids selling assets that are not owned. These factors affect the quality of the assets in IB 
though quality of the ROA and the z-score (i.e. the stability). Moreover, we can observe from 
figure 7 that IB has lower leverage than CB, due to the restriction placed by Islamic laws on the 
sale of debt and CBs using more debt to finance their assets.  
 Figure 4 also shows that the z-score for CB after the crisis time, which increased by 18%, was 
higher than the z-score of IB, which decreased by 5.28%. This is because the return on assets for 
CB increased by 51% compared to 2008. For IB, the ROA decreased by 0.68%. The downward 
trend in the z-score for IB after the crisis came about because IBs are strongly related to the real 
economy, and property markets declined in many countries where IBs are strongly represented. 
In addition, UAE is one of the biggest oil-and gas-producing countries (Vcantugakkas, 2017). 
After the crisis and the subsequent recession, oil prices fell from 94.1$ for a barrel in 2008 to 
60.86$ for a barrel in 2009, and between 2008-10 the oil price declined by 21% (See Figure 10). 
Therefore, IBs were not directly affected by the last financial crisis. These results are consistent 
with Gallali & Chakroun (2015). Figure 5, indicates that on average the z-score for UAE banks 
(IB & CB) are between 20-27 which are consistent with the results of this study sample, and we 
can observe that the banks’ z-score for UAE are below the z-score for US banks except the 
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period 2008-09 where the last financial crisis happened.  
Figure 6: Average ROA. Source: author’s calculations.
  
Figure 7: Average leverage for IB & CB. Source: author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 8: GDP growth of USA and UAE. Source: Tradingeconomics 
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Figure 9: Inflation rates of USA and UAE. Source: Tradingeconomics  
 
Figure 10: Average annual crude oil price. Source: Statista 
 
 
5.1- Regression results and discussion 
 
 
Table 10: Regression results: Panel ordinary least squares, 2008-15. Source: EViews calcualtions. 
 Normal Excluding leverage 
Dep. Variable Z-score Z-score 
Islamic Dummy 20.07 (0.23) 54.30 (0.00)*** 
Assets -2.30 (0.008)*** -1.6 (0.06)* 
ROA 24.53 (0.96) 461.33 (0.48) 
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Leverage -6.27 (0.00)***  
GDP growth -1.83 (0.45) -0.39 (0.87) 
Inflation 0.40 (0.86) -0.19 (0.93) 
Constant 110.74 (0.00)*** 24.65 (0.04)** 
R2 0.25 0.13 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.08 
F (P value) 5.2 (0.00) 2.81 (0.02) 
 Observations 96 96 
 P values in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
  
In the panel data above we have two model, one model includes the leverage and the other model 
does not include the leverage. When I made the regression first time, the leverage was not 
included and in order to increase the value of R squared and have more control variable, I 
included the leverage since it was available, and this is the reason why I have two models  
 From the panel above, it can be observed that in these models (normal and excluding leverage) a 
negative relationship exists between assets (i.e. bank size) and the z-score; as the size of the 
banks becomes larger, their stability tends to decrease when using the z-score as a measure. 
Results show a significant relation at 1% when including the leverage and 10% when excluding 
the leverage, as a decrease in assets of 1 unit will decrease the z-score by 2.30 and 1.6 
respectively. This indicates that when banks get larger they face more risk management 
challenges. This finding is consistent with Islam & Kozokov (2009), but diverges with the 
findings of Čihák & Hesse (2008). One possible reason could be the small sample size in the 
present study. 
Risk management challenges arise because Islamic banks use conventional risk management     
techniques and tools to face and reduce risks, but risk management tools in conventional banks 
are related to the interest rate, and this tools become complex for Islamic banks when they apply 
those tools because of the Shariah laws that IBs follow and variety of contracts they use. 
Moreover, specifying the right and new products that Islamic banks can work with or invest in 
become an important issue because of the time that could be spend, effort and cost and those may 
be consider as risk management challenges faced by Islamic banks. 
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Table 10 presents that in each model at least one beta coefficient is significant. R-squared has a 
value between 13% and 25% reflecting that the sample explain a small portion of the z-score (the 
stability). Čihák and Hesse (2008) also found a low R-squared ranging between 15% and 22% 
with different specifications. 
From the panel regression, it can be observed that the Islamic dummy being positive implies that 
IB are less risky than CB, since there is a positive relationship and a higher z-score implies less 
risk. Moreover, when leverage is excluded, the Islamic dummy becomes significant. This is 
because the leverage has stronger predictive power on the z-score. This means that banking 
stability as measured by the z-score is driven more by leverage than the banks being either IB or 
CB.    
In the table 10, we have a panel regression, and this implies that in each model at least one beta 
coefficient is significant. R squared suggest that in the normal model which include the outliers 
or all different banks’ size has 25% and only 13% when excluding the leverage. Čihák and Hesse 
(2008) also had a low R-squared ranging between 15% and 22% with different specification.  
In the panel regression, we can observe that when Islamic dummy is positive implies that IB are 
less risky than CB, because there is positive relation and the higher the z-score imply less risky. 
Moreover, when we exclude the leverage, the Islamic dummy turns significant and this is 
because the leverage has stronger predictive power on the z-score. Which means that the banking 
stability-as measured by the z-score is driven more by the leverage rather than the fact whether 
the banks are of the IB or CB. In addition, in figure 7, we can see that the leverage for IB in the 
sample is lower than CB leverage, suggesting that IB is more efficient and less risky than CB in 
this sample. This results are consistent with Čihák and Hesse (2008) who found that large IB has 
lower z-score (less stable) than large CB, while small IB has higher z-score (more stable) than 
large and small CB.  
From the panel regression, it can also be observed that a negative relationship exists between 
leverage and z-score which is significant at 1%, suggesting a strong effect of the leverage on the 
bank’s stability regardless of whether it is IB or CB. This in turn suggests that a bank that 
finances its equity with debt faces more risks. 
In table 10, we can observe the positive relation between the ROA and the stability (z-score) but 
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it is not significant, suggesting the positive relation between the profit and the stability.  
In terms of the macroeconomic variables, it can be observed that there are no significant effects 
on the z-score (stability) in this sample, but that there is a negative relationship between the GDP 
growth and the z-score, a possible explanation is that an increase in the economic activities in the 
country may increase the banks size and this would have negative impact on the stability. 
Moreover, there is no significant relationship between the inflation rate and the z-score. These 
results are consistent with Čihák and Hesse (2008), who found that macroeconomic variables are 
not significantly related to the z-score (the stability). 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and proposal for further research 
The objective of the present study was to empirically examine the financial stability of Islamic 
banks and conventional banks during and after the last financial crisis (2006-2015).  By using z-
score as a measure of stability, it was determined that overall, Islamic banks tends to be less 
stable than conventional banks, and that this was due to regulatory and management challenges 
in IBs. Interestingly, Islamic banks performed better than conventional banks during the crisis, 
suggesting that Islamic laws helped Islamic banks to stand against the crisis. However, Islamic 
banks were affected in the next stages of the crisis due to strong relationship between Islamic 
banks and the real economy, suggesting that there is management challenges faced Islamic banks 
after the last financial crisis.  
Panel regression suggested that Islamic banks were not significantly more stable than 
conventional banks when leverage was included, suggesting that the leverage has strong 
predictive power for the z-score. The regression indicates that banking stabilityas measured by 
the z-scoreis driven more by the leverage regardless of whether the bank type is Islamic or 
conventional. Additionally, the leverage of Islamic banks was smaller than the leverage of 
conventional banks, implying greater long-term financial safety for Islamic banks in this sample. 
Banks level variables, suggested that for the banks to perform better during and after crisis, the 
banks can invest in real assets, depend on other resource than debt to reduce the leverage affect. 
It might be less profitable, but it will be more stable for any further crisis. Therefore, those 
variables (real assets and leverage) add the quality to the stability when using the z-score as a 
measure because they are significantly related to the stability.  
There is still a wide scope for further research. In particular, the sample could be extended to 
include more countries and banks. More data may help in arriving at a better understanding of 
the strong relationship between leverage and the bank stability presented in this paper, for 
different sizes of banks as well as non-fully-fledged Islamic banks.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 11: annual average z-score of IBs. Source: Authors calculation 
Dubai Emirate Abu dahbi Sharjah jordan
ROA+G3 z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score
####### 2006 21.81 9.33  
####### 2007 21.11 6.85 37.97
####### 2008 16.43 5.81 25.15 312.42 41.15
####### 2009 16.34 8.78 22.37 312.89 36.37
####### 2010 16.28 6.54 24.09 305.85 33.17
####### 2011 16.75 6.46 25.97 290.14 31.47
####### 2012 17.68 5.28 31.94 284.44 34.05
####### 2013 21.54 7.99 27.95 246.19 35.52
####### 2014 22.37 9.40 27.38 210.88 35.72
####### 2015 24.01 7.15 28.52 189.07 36.74  
 
Table 12: annual average  leverage of IBs. Source: Authors calculation 
leverage Dubai leverage Emirate leverage Abu Dahbi leverage Sharjah leverage jordan 
2006 6.30 9.84   
2007 6.91 11.72  3.89 3.73
2008 8.53 14.77 8.09 2.74 3.72
2009 8.39 7.80 7.97 2.75 3.76
2010 7.56 10.19 8.28 2.83 4.03
2011 7.90 7.67 7.67 3.02 4.19
2012 8.03 13.21 5.80 3.12 4.00
2013 5.93 8.57 6.89 3.79 3.99
2014 6.00 8.53 7.18 4.67 3.92
2015 5.58 9.44 6.85 5.35 3.89  
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Table 13: annual average  ROA of IBs. Source: Authors calculation 
Dubai&islamic&bank Dubai Emirate Abu DAHBI Sharjah Jordan 
TA ROA ROA ROA  ROA ROA
64433936 2006 0.024 0.034
84359911 2007 0.030 0.014 0.014
84756617 2008 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.019
84304271 2009 0.014 0.005 0.001 0.016 0.013
89884401 2010 0.006 0.002 0.014 0.016 0.011
90588464 2011 0.012 -0.020 0.016 0.014 0.010
98611212 2012 0.012 0.002 0.014 0.015 0.012
######### 2013 0.015 0.004 0.014 0.014 0.014
######### 2014 0.023 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.013
######### 2015 0.026 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.013  
 
Table 14: annual average z-score of CBs. Source: Authors calculation 
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Table 15: annual average leverage of CBs. Surce: Authors calculation 
Bank of AmericaJPMC PNC Goldman sachsBNY mellon SEB Swedbank
leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage
2006 11.24 11.67 9.44 23.42 9.03
2007 11.72 12.68 9.35 26.16 6.72
2008 10.27 13.03 11.45 13.74 8.46 28.99 19.95
2009 9.61 12.29 8.29 12.01 7.32 22.16 18.95
2010 9.92 12.02 8.05 11.78 7.48 20.90 16.00
2011 9.25 12.34 7.28 13.12 9.54 20.64 17.37
2012 9.33 11.56 7.31 12.40 9.63 21.40 16.90
2013 9.03 11.44 7.27 11.62 9.77 19.23 15.60
2014 8.64 11.10 7.49 10.34 10.01 20.46 17.07
2015 8.37 9.50 7.80 9.93 10.16 17.85 16.42 
 
 
Table 16: annual average ROA of CBs. Source: Authors calculation 
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Figure 11: Average annual OPEC crude oil from 1960 to 2017. Source: Statista 
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